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                                                                           Abstract 
            This article studies the properties of gifts that lead them to be considered as bribe  when 
offered to public officials. The model first handles only three goods that are to be given as gift,  then 
extends the case to N goods. We provide a two-stage analysis for both cases.  At the first stage we 
deal with a situation in which an officer can only consume the gift offered to him and we find out 
that the officer's preferences will determine the bribery conditions. Second, we give the officer the 
opportunity of exchanging the gift for his most preferred good and reach the conclusion that besides 
his preferences liquidity will affect the corrupt dealings.
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                                                                            Özet
   Bu çalışma devlet dairelerinde çalışan memurlara getirilen hediyelerin hangi kapsamda rüşvete 
gireceğiyle ilgilidir. Kurduğumuz model ilk etapta hediye olarak verilebilen üç malı ele alıp sonra 
bunu N mala genellemektedir. Her iki durum için iki aşamalı bir analiz geliştiriyoruz. İlk aşamada 
memurun  gelen  hediyeyi  sadece  tüketebildiğini  düşünüp  mallar  üzerindeki  tercihlerinin  rüşvete 
sebep olduğu sonucuna ulaşıyoruz.  İkinci  aşamada ise  memura gelen  hediyeyi  satıp  en sevdiği 
maldan alabilme opsiyonu tanıyoruz ve tercihlerinin yanısıra bu sefer hediyenin likiditesinin de 
rüşvete yol açabildiğini görüyoruz.
Anahtar Sözcükler : Rüşvet, hediyeleşme, tercih, likidite, en uygun politika.
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1 Introduction
Corruption as a pervasive worldwide phenomenon is the misuse of public power for
private gain1. It generally occurs in the principal-agent relationships in public sector
where agents have discretionary power on the distribution of benefits. Issuing a permit
or licence, giving permission to the passage of the custom goods or favoring relatives,
friends are typical examples that the public officials use discretion while providing gov-
ernment goods or services. In order to collect bribes from private individuals, underpaid
public officials with little incentives may impose delays on the demanded service. So,
bribes sometimes, not only produce mutual benefits for the payer and the receiver but
also create efficiency in the public sector. Mostly, it is the burdensome government rules
and regulations that cause corrupt incentives to arise within an organization. A private
individual may pay bribe to overcome this slow going process and improve efficiency.
This seemingly positive effect of bribe taking however, does not supply a valid argument
for tolerating some level of corruption. Besides the benefits for both sides that agree to
participate in a bribery, a serious social harm is generated due to corruption. Income
inequalities, low growth rates, distortions in industrial policies, the lack of trust on the
functionality of the government and its institutions are the main adverse effects of cor-
ruption that are included in the social harm. This fact is the underlying reason why we
assume in our model that the total surplus (total benefit of both sides minus the total cost)
generated by a corrupt dealing is negative. Since the social harm as a cost exceeds the
existing total net benefit, the increasing number of people engaged in a corrupt interaction
will cause too much loss in the social welfare. Thus, taking corruption under control to
an extent will appear as the government’s or principal’s objective in an organization. In
controlling corruption, the government as a policy maker aims to improve the efficiency
of the state and the overall welfare of the society. Full elimination of corruption in some
contexts is neither possible nor economically sensible. The interesting part of our model
about this mentioned point is that totally preventing corruption is possible but not worth-
while because the maximum social welfare is sacrificed to getting rid of it. Taking steps
towards reducing the harm it generates is a better task to deal with.
Moreover, the secrecy of a corrupt dealing is a serious difficulty in detecting the actual
level of corruption so, the predictions based on the uncovered part of the corruption level
in an organization or country possibly does not reflect the truth. Since both parties in a
bribery benefit and the dealing is illegal, it is unlikely that one of them will uncover the
arrangement. That is why the secrecy issue also makes the goal of total elimination of
corruption more difficult.
Gift giving behavior on the other hand, is a social interaction that invests in a rela-
tionship between the donor and the recipient. By means of a gift, a donor is interested
1Susan Rose-Ackerman, 1999, Corruption and Government.
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in revealing the recipient’s preferences2. Giving a gift carries the message of the donor
to the recipient that "I recognize you and know what you like". Although a gift may be
inefficient, i.e., it may create a deadweight loss, it is an important and effective way of ex-
pressing one’s valuation of the opposite side in a relation. No one who wants to be known
as valuing the partner’s preferences will give cash gifts. Thus, a donor gets pleasure as the
gift he gives matches with the recipient’s preferences, that is to say he behaves altruistic.
While the sociological approach of gift giving behavior does not involve reciprocity, it
may sometimes be intentionally offered to get a benefit. So, this is the point where a quid
pro quo exists in gift giving. For example, giving a highly valuable and expensive gift
such as gold, diamond even cash to a friend’s daughter in her wedding and after a period
of time requesting a permit for a construction of a high building in a forbidden zone from
this friend who is also a public official issuing permits, is a case in which an implicit
reciprocity appears. If such reciprocal obligations exist in gift giving interactions, even
if the donor’s actual demand is not immediate, then the intention behind the gift moves
towards bribery. So, the similarity of gifts and bribes stems from the existence of a quid
pro quo.
These two aspects of gift giving, either giving it to please the recipient or expecting a
return from it are captured in our model by introducing two types of clients who interact
with an officer and who have these intentions. The honest client in the model gives an
officer a gift to appreciate his manner of supplying the service and to please him, whereas
the dishonest client seeks a benefit by offering a gift. While gift giving to the officer
in the government institutions in this sense is a case which at first look seems to be a
social interaction between the officer and the client, it may in some cases turn out to be an
interaction that leads to corruption. Thus, in our corruption model the bribery intention
of gift-offering client is reflected.
This paper is mostly related to the literature on corruption. We contribute to the liter-
ature in the way that we link the gift-giving event with its social and economic aspects to
the growing corruption literature. Focusing on a public official and client interaction in
which a gift is offered to the officer instead of money bribes is the point which makes our
work different. There is no chance for the officer and the client to bargain over the size
of the bribe because this time the size of the bribe is determined by the value of the gift
offered. So, if the client seeks a benefit behind the gift, he would choose among the goods
regarded as appropriate in the society because this would lead the officer to accept the
gift more easily. Identifying an appropriate gift is a part of gift-giving that is independent
of one’s intention. If a client as in our model is dishonest, i.e., if he has the intention of
bribing the officer via a gift, he would like to offer one of the goods which is known to be
suitable and liquid such as a brand watch.
Our framework differs from the existing literature in that we propose that the govern-
2Prendergast and Stole, (2000), The non-monetary nature of gifts.
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ment’s strategy in controlling corruption is to prohibit the goods which if prohibited will
produce the maximum social welfare. In the formal literature the government’s strategy
appears as imposing a penalty both for the bribe giver and taker and reward schemes for
the supervisor, if there is any, who is hired to monitor the agent’s performance and report
his wrong doings. However, in our context the government’s decision on the fine levels
for the briber and bribee does not guarantee a decrease in corruption because the client
can offer another good which is not fined. Thus, the level of fines affects both the officer’s
and the client’s decision on offering or accepting the prohibited good. If the fine level is
sufficiently high, then the dishonest client may offer a gift from the nonprohibited goods
and achieve his/her goal.
1.1 Literature Review
In this section we discuss the related literature on corruption and gifts in order to
highlight the contribution of the present thesis. In our framework, goods as gifts and
money as bribe are substitutable, and the degree of substitutability between any good and
money is an inherent property of that good. While we know of no paper in which the issue
of bribery and gifts is addressed, there are many separate theoretical studies of corruption
and gifts. We discuss a selection from these papers below.
A review of this literature by Pranab Bardhan (1997) points out the adverse effects
of corruption on development. In his paper he states that bribes on investment licences
reduce the incentives to invest and cause profits to decline on production. Further, when
public resources are abused for the corrupt officer’s private gain growth rates will be neg-
atively affected. He summarizes the arguments on factors that can produce both efficient
and inefficient outcomes. If in a bribery, many firms compete in bidding process for a
government contract, the firm with the highest bid in bribes is also the lowest cost firm
which is awarded with the contract. So, efficiency is achieved in such a case. Further, due
to pervasive and cumbersome regulations corruption may improve efficiency when one
pays to speed the procedure. The worst effects of bribes in terms of inefficiency is ob-
served in different agencies which supply complementary government goods or services
and set their bribes independently. This procedure reduces total supply because of high
level of bribes reducing inefficiency.
Schleifer and Vishny (1993) take up this idea in their study of the industrial organiza-
tion of corruption and illustrate the inefficiency caused by corruption. First, they introduce
two types of corrupt activities. In the activity they name ’corruption without theft’ a pub-
lic official sells a licence for government by taking bribe over the price of the good and
he turns over the price to the government taking the bribe for himself. In the ’corruption
with theft’ case however, the official does not turn anything to the government and hides
the sale. This type of corrupt activities are common in custom duties. Then, they provide
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a model that compares the bribe levels and inefficiency in independent monopolists which
consist of public agencies providing complementary goods and in joint monopolist that
supply the same goods. They reach the conclusion that in the former case, each agency
takes the others’ sale as given and sets their own bribes so as to maximize their revenues.
The bribe per unit sale is higher and the supply of the goods is lower so, an inefficient case
is generated. In the latter case however, the joint monopolist sets the bribe to maximize
the total revenue, which they show results in a lower bribe per unit sale and higher supply
of goods. Thus, a relatively more efficient case and higher aggregate level of bribes are
achieved. They further provide an extension to their model in which each complemen-
tary good is supplied by many public agencies and stress on the point that competition
pulls the bribe level down to zero by creating the most efficient case. Their industrial
organization model suggests that generating competition between the public officials in
the process of obtaining government goods will eliminate the corruption without theft.
In the case of corruption with theft however, competition may cause more theft from the
government while it reduces the bribes.
Similarly, Susan Rose-Ackerman (1975) studies the relationship between the market
structure and the corrupt interactions in the process of obtaining a government contract
and provides a three-stage analysis that includes varying market conditions. In her model
she handles a situation in which many firms are assumed to compete for a government
procurement contract. She then drops the competition assumption to consider the case of
bilateral monopoly where a bargaining process determines the bribe level. In the former
case, there are many sellers competing for a public contract. The existence of a private
market eliminates bribes totally but if there is no private market, using sealed bids to de-
termine the contractor can also solve the bribery problem. She determines the factors that
lead to corruption and the ways to reduce it by effective penalty schemes. An interesting
point is that the level of bribe depends on the properties of the penalty functions. So, the
model suggests certain penalty schemes that are effective to reduce the bribes in the in-
dicated market conditions. But when the penalties are ineffective then the identity of the
successful corrupt firm is the most efficient one, i.e., the firm which minimizes its costs.
In the latter case in which only a single buyer and a seller bargain over the size of the
bribe, the firms which find waiting costly are more likely to pay the bribe.
The formal literature on corruption has been also developed on hierarchial aspect.
Mehmet Bac (1996) provides an extension to the corruption in different hierarchial struc-
tures by studying the relation between monitoring and corruption. The approach in his
article differs in that the incentives, wages and rewards, that aim to minimize the cost of
corruption are taken as given so as to better understand the role of hierarchial structures in
leading to corrupt dealings. The assumption of an exogenous incentive scheme includes
same wages for all agents and same rewards for all supervisors in order to simplify the
analysis and help the above mentioned goal. He considers the possibility of internal cor-
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ruption that is defined as the transfer of subordinate’s benefit from external corruption to
the upper levels. In addition, external corruption is simply the case that we already know
as a bribe taking official from a client outside an organization. In his framework two types
of monitoring technologies are introduced namely, public monitoring (supervisor simulta-
neously monitors a group of subordinates) and private monitoring (supervisor monitors a
particular subordinate). Under both monitoring technologies a trade-off between external
and internal corruption in flat and steep hierarchial structures is observed. In the model, a
flat hierarchy refers to minimal one rank extension that consists of a supervisor at the top
and a group of subordinates who are monitored at the bottom. A steep hierarchy however,
is referred as maximal one rank extension in which each supervisor’s monitoring effort
is only for one subordinate. He reaches the conclusions that under public monitoring
external corruption is less in a flat hierarchy than in a steep one but much more internal
corruption is likely to arise within a flat hierarchy than in a steep one. As for the case of
private monitoring, the situation is a little different. Since the monitoring cost increases
significantly as monitoring effort increases, supervisor’s monitoring effort is low so, all
subordinates are corrupt in a flat hierarchy. The type of monitoring technology does not
matter for a steep hierarchy however. Thus, due to the convexity assumption of the cost
function higher corruption is expected in a flat hierarchy.
Mookherjee and Png (1995) provided a model that focuses on the compensation of a
corruptible inspector delegated with the task of monitoring pollution from a factory. Their
model displays similarity to the principal-supervisor-agent paradigm in the way that the
legislature who layouts the enforcement for the prohibited actions takes the place of prin-
cipal. The inspector however, is charged with monitoring pollution in order to enforce
the regulations. So, his expected task is analogous to the supervisor who is hired to en-
hance an organization’s functionality. The factory finally, like the agent, can offer bribes
to the upper levels to cover its wrongdoings. In their set up the regulator’s optimal pol-
icy consists of three instruments; the penalty for bribe giver and taker and the reward for
the inspector’s report of pollution level. Social harm caused by corruption in the model
appears as external harm caused by the factory’s pollution. The inspector incurs an unob-
servable effort to monitor the factory so, he has discretion over reporting the level of waste
discharged by the factory. The bribe between the inspector and the factory is determined
by their simultaneous choice of monitoring effort and pollution respectively. In contrast
to the usual extensive form of non-cooperative game models, bribe is the outcome of the
Nash bargaining solution where the surplus is equally split between the parties. When-
ever the inspector observes any level of pollution, he reports it as zero. This result stems
solely from the assumption that the rate of leak that is defined as the probability that the
factory’s actual pollution level will leak to the regulator is constant. The effects of the
compensation policy on the agreed bribe level is observed. An increase in the reward rate
and penalty for the inspector raises the level of bribe because the cost of not reporting
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the pollution rises so, he demands a higher bribe. They show that one way to eliminate
corruption is to sufficiently increase the reward or the penalty of the inspector such that
the inspector’s demand exceeds the factory’s limit to pay for the bribe. Another way to re-
duce the bribe is shown as to increase the penalty on the factory and reduce the penalty for
the inspector. This recommendation contrasts with the usual method of penalizing bribe
givers less severely than the bribe takers. While the regulator’s objective is to avoid cor-
rupt incentives by adjusting either rewards or penalties, he can unintentionally contribute
to the harm produced by pollution. In this sense, their model suggests an important result:
given a compensation policy, the regulator can construct another policy that generates
less pollution without increasing monitoring effort. Thus, due to this alternative corrup-
tion will be eradicated and bribery will be leaved as an inefficient way of private gain for
the inspector.
In a similar framework, Bowles and Garoupa (1997) extend Becker’s standard eco-
nomic model of crime in which a police officer and a criminal can collude for their inter-
ests. They apply a solution developed in a related work by Cadot to derive the optimal
policy to compensate the corruptible police officer. In their model officers differ in their
susceptibility to involve in bribery and they engage in crime by taking bribe to cover the
criminal activity in return. The probability of successful bribe is endogenous. If bribe is
detected, both parties are subject to fines. Following the approach of Cadot (1987), they
apply the bargaining solution where parties can have different bargaining powers. First,
an individual decides to commit a crime or not. If he acts as a criminal and is detected by
a police officer, bargaining process over the bribe starts. If the process is successful the
officer’s illegal activity also can be detected. They make two important assumptions in
their model. The first is that only the collusion between police officer and the criminal is
considered, possible collusion among officers is ignored. The second is that officers de-
tected while taking the bribe will not have to repay the money but will have to encounter
a cost for involving in corruption which corresponds to future income that a convicted
corrupt officer will not receive. The bribe increases with the fine imposed on the criminal
because he will agree to pay more to avoid a larger fine. Similarly, the bribe increases
with the fine imposed on the police officer because the cost of taking bribe increases.
This result implies that higher fine may deter crime but contributes to corruption. The
attitudes towards corruption determine the officer’s decision on whether being corrupt or
not. Optimal policy of the police department is to control not only corruption within the
organization but also the crime rate. In this sense, the fines imposed both on the criminal
and the police officer and the probability of detection affect deterrence and the rate of
corruptible police officers.
Besides the formal studies on corruption, gift-giving has been studied by several
economists. The question of "Why do individuals give gifts?" has not only been the con-
cern of anthropology but also has recently been addressed byCamerer (1988), Carmichael
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and Mac Leod (1997). Prendergast and Stole (2000) rather address the form in which the
gift should be given in social relationships within a signaling game model. They are in-
terested in the question of "Why non-monetary gifts prevail over the efficient monetary
transfers despite the possibility of generating deadweight loss?" They come closer to our
analysis in that they provide an understanding of the gift-giving phenomenon. In our
model this corresponds to the honest client’s gift-giving behavior. In their set up, they
consider a donor and a recipient where the donor receives a signal that carries informa-
tion about the recipient’s preferences. They, however, assume only two goods that are
to be given as gift which is a restriction because when there are many goods, the donor
will be able to send a more precise message in which he can order the goods. Receiving
the signal from the recipient, the donor chooses either giving cash gift or purchasing a
non-monetary gift. At the beginning of the game, nature chooses which of the gift the
recipient prefers. The donor observes the signal and decides on the form of the gift and
the recipient forms an expectation about the donor’s ability to understand his preferences.
They assume that the purchased gift is only consumed due to the high costs of the refunds
of the gift. In our analysis we extend this assumption by giving the officer the opportu-
nity of selling the gift in order to highlight the impact of liquidity in causing corruption.
Both agents in their model derive utility from the value of consumption, the welfare of the
other agent and the knowledge that other party understands his/her preferences. So, both
agents are altruistic towards each other and the level of altruism and their concern about
being known to understand the recipient’s preferences are key determinants of the form
of the gift they decide. Marginal rate of substitution of these two sources of utility will
determine the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes. Finally, they reach the conclusions
that if the donor is interested in the recipient’s welfare rather than to be known to under-
stand his preferences, he chooses cash as gift. If the donor, however, values revealing the
recipient’s preferences more than his welfare, he purchases a non-monetary gift.
The thesis is organized is as follows. The next section presents the model in which we
address the question of "When gifts offered to public officials are considered as bribe?"
In Section 3 we begin our analysis by considering only three goods -money and two non
monetary goods - that has specific liquidity values and two types of clients -honest and
dishonest- that buy gifts to the officer with different intentions. We first assume that
the officer can only consume the gift offered. After characterizing the behaviors of the
clients on which good to offer, we determine the corresponding expected payoffs and
the expected social welfare. We find out the case and the optimal policy in which the
maximum social welfare is achieved when the government prohibits any of the good(s).
We extend the analysis in Section 4 by rather assuming that the officer can sell the
gift and repeat the procedure to derive the conditions that yields the government’s optimal
policy.
Section 5 generalizes the special case of three goods to N goods in order to draw an
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inference about the property of the gifts that lead to bribery. We again analyze this case
in two stages by first considering the officer only consumes the gift and then he can sell
the gift respectively.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the thesis by presenting a summary and discussion of the
results.
2 Model
We classify the goods according to their liquidity values. We assume that there are
three goods and all the goods have some liquidity value, which is denoted as ”α” . One of
the three goods is money. We place all the three goods with respect to their characteristic
value, αi, i = 0, 1, 2 in the interval [0,1] in such a way that the most liquid good, money,
has liquidity α0 and the least liquid good with characteristic of α2 is closest to ′1′. The
last good has liquidity ′α′1 such that α1 ∈ (α0, α2). We measure units so that all three
goods can be purchased at the price of $1. The sale value of good αi is 1−αi. Money, for
example, has liquidity 0 and value $1, whereas another good with α = 0.4 has sale value
$0.6 .
Below we introduce the notation and then describe the model and the sequence of
events. Some of the variables are further explained in the analysis.
Fo= fine for the officer detected accepting a prohibited gift,
Fc= fine for the client detected giving a prohibited gift,
p(α)= probability of successful bribery, without being detected,
µ= probability of detection of bribe given that the client accepts a banned gift,
β= moral coefficient (type component) of the officer, measuring the personal discount
applied on corrupt benefits,
pi= probability that α1 is the officer’s most preferred good,
G= cumulative distribution of the officers with respect to their moral coefficient, β,
b= private benefit of the client from the bribe,
c= the officer’s cost of supplying the demanded service in return for a bribe,
Us(αi, q)= The utility of officer s from any good, αi with i = 0, 1, 2 of quantity q,
h= social harm caused by corruption,
γ= probability that the client is of a honest type.
We consider an officer who may sell government property for personal gain. He will
have to pay a fine Fo for accepting the prohibited gift(s) only if he is detected. The
officer’s moral coefficient β ∈ [0, 1] influences the decision on taking the bribe. If β = 1,
he will not hesitate to take the bribe if the fine is sufficiently small. If β = 0, he will never
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accept the bribe. The other component of the type of an officer is αi, indicating his most
preferred good. The pair (β, αi) is the officer’s privately known type.
The clients who apply to the officer in order to receive a government good or service,
have two potential types; the honest client simply seeks to please the officer by giving
a non-monetary gift. He never has any intention to bribe. The second is the dishonest
type whose aim is to get a service to which he is not entitled by giving the officer a gift.
If the bribe is detected, he has to pay a fine Fc, again only for the prohibited gift(s).
While both types of agents buy a gift for the officer despite their different intentions, the
officer’s preferences over the goods are unknown by the client. All client types value
money equally.
The objective of the government is to control corruption. To this end, it decides to
prohibit some of the goods to be given as a gift. We handle the cases of government’s
prohibiting only one good, prohibiting any two goods and the case of not permitting any
of them. We point out what consequences will arise from point view of both client types
and the officer by deriving their expected payoffs and find out the corresponding social
welfare values in each of these cases. After determining the case in which maximum so-
cial welfare is achieved, we determine the optimal fine levels which are the government’s
other instruments in controlling corruption .
The sequence of events in the model is as follows:
• The government determines Fo, Fc and which good(s) to prohibit.
• A client is matched with an officer. The officer learns the type of the client(honest/dishonest),
the officer’s β and αi remain private knowledge.3
• The client decides on whether to offer a gift/bribe, and in the affirmative, on which
good to offer as gift/bribe. The officer makes an acceptance/rejection decision.
• Detected bribe transactions are penalized; payoffs are realized.
At the first stage of our analysis, we assume only three goods one of which is money.
The officer’s preferences are defined over the remaining two non- monetary goods. Since
money is the most valuable asset from which everyone derives maximum utility, we also
need some additional non-monetary goods that may create deadweight loss or failure in
successful bribe when they are offered as gift/bribe. If there were only the officer’s most
preferred good besides money, the dishonest client would have more chance for successful
bribe even if money is prohibited because this most preferred good of the officer gives him
the maximum utility as money does. But, in the case of assuming two non monetary goods
3This may not be a reasonable assumption in practice. If the officer is incompletely informed about the
type of the client, the analysis become very complex; some of the issues that arise are tangential to the main
points we raise in this paper
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one of which is the good that gives the officer ’0’ utility, the dishonest client faces the risk
of failure in his bribe offer. Analogously, if we assume only two goods including money
and the non monetary good giving ’0’ utility, the dishonest type can only offer money as
bribe for the allowing fine levels. The honest client, however, is hurt because he can only
choose the good which gives the officer ’0’ utility.
3 Optimal policy when the gift must be consumed
3.1 The Government prohibits one good
In this section, we assume that the officer consumes whatever he gets as gift or bribe.
Later we shall allow him to exchange the gift/bribe for another good. Clearly, if the
government prohibits one of the three goods this will be money, because the officer’s
benefit from money is equivalent to the utility he gets from his most preferred good. With
$1, he can buy the good which gives him the maximum utility. If one of non-monetary
goods is prohibited, the dishonest type will give $1 as a cash gift and maximize the payoff
from his corrupt behavior.
3.1.1 The Honest Client
To start with the honest type, he will choose the gift from the permitted goods. He
behaves altruistically. His final utility from giving good αi as gift consists of a fraction φ
of officer’s utility:
EUch = φUs(αi, 1)− 1
where i = 1,2 and φ ∈ (0,1). Here, Us(αi, 1) is the utility of officer s from consuming
q=1 unit of his most preferred good, αi. The subscript ch denotes the honest client type.
This client type gets the maximum utility when he buys the officer’s most preferred good
which he does not know. He knows, however, that with probability pi the officer likes α1
most, with probability (1- pi) he likes α2 most. We denote the officer’s utility as:
Uαj(αi, 1) =
u, if i = j = 1, 2,0, if i 6= j.
The subscript αj denotes the officer’s type whereas αi denotes the gift’s characteris-
tic. If the gift and the officer’s preferences match, then he gets u, the maximum utility;
otherwise he gets ’0’.
Both clients choose a gift from the free goods by taking the distribution of αi in to
account. The expected payoffs and the SW values will become a function of pi. We dis-
tinguish between the following cases:
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If pi ≥ 1
2
, the probability that officer is of type α1 is higher than that of type α2. The
honest client in this case gives α1 as a gift. So, if the officer’s type is α1, he gets u utility
otherwise, he gets ’0’ utility. So, an officer gets piu expected utility when α1 is given as a
gift. Analogously, for pi < 1
2
, the honest client gives α2 as a gift. An officer gets u utility
with probability (1− pi). His expected payoff under these conditions is given as:
EUo =
piu, if pi ≥ 12 ,(1− pi)u, if pi > 1
2
.
Then, the honest client’s expected utility from offering any non-monetary gift is
EUch =
piφu− 1, if pi ≥ 12 ,(1− pi)φu− 1, if pi < 1
2
.
The officer gets u utility with probability pi and gets ’0’ utility in the worst scenario so,
he accepts everything from the honest type.
3.1.2 The Dishonest Client
Consider now the dishonest type. This type of client wants the officer to accept the
bribe. He has two options: to give money or one of the permitted goods.
His expected utility from offering money is
EUcd = p(0).b− 1− µFc (1)
where the subscript cd denotes the dishonest client. Note that, he does not consider giving
money if the expected utility in (1) is negative, that is, if
p(0).b− 1− µFc < 0.
Any government’s policy instruments in controlling corruption, include imposing fines
on both the bribe giver and the bribe taker. If the fine imposed on the client exceeds a
certain value, the dishonest client will not offer money. Assuming p(0) = 1, that is, that
bribery is surely successful, there is a critical fine level Fc = b−1µ such that for Fc ≥ Fc,
the dishonest client gets negative expected payoff. So, it is sufficient for the government
to set Fc a little higher than this critical value in order to eliminate money to be given as
bribe.
On the other hand, the officer accepts money if the condition below holds:
EUo = βUs(αs, 1)− µFo − c ≥ 0.
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Recall that αs is the officer’s most preferred good, which yields him the maximum utility,
Us(αs, 1) = u. The cost ’c’ is assumed to be positive that is, the dishonest client will give
some effort in order to supply the demanded service for the dishonest client. Thus, for a
successful bribe transfer both of the conditions below must hold:
Feasible bribe p(0).b− 1− µFc ≥ 0
conditions : βu− µFo − c ≥ 0.
Given the fine Fo, the officers who accept the bribe are those with β ≥ µFo+cu . Since
β ≤ 1, the second condition will hold only if µFo + c ≤ u. The officers with β < µFo+cu
reject the bribe. There will be no corrupt officers accepting money if µFo + c > u. There
is a critical Fo, denoted as Fo, and is given by
(u−c)
µ
such that it is sufficient for government
to set a fine a little bit higher than Fo in order to eliminate money bribes.
Consider now the possibility that the dishonest client offers one of the free goods as
gift/bribe. The dishonest type will buy the good which has the higher probability of being
the officer’s most preferred good. So, if pi ≥ 1
2
, the dishonest client offers α1. He gets
p(α1)b−1 utility with probability pi (when his choice and the officer’s preferences match)
and ’0’ with probability (1 − pi). For the case of pi < 1
2
, he offers α2 as bribe and gets
p(α2)b− 1 with probability (1− pi) only if the officer is of type α2 otherwise he gets ’0’.
So, his expected utility from offering any free good αi is
EUcd =
pip(α1)b− 1, if pi ≥ 12 ,(1− pi)p(α2)b− 1, if pi < 12 .
The officer on the other hand, accepts the offer of good αi if
EUo = βUs(αi, 1)− c ≥ 0 where i = 1, 2.
From the point view of the officer, if he is of type α2, he rejects the bribe when α1 is
offered as bribe because the good he does not like gives him ’0’ utility and there is a
cost c from accepting the bribe (Note that there is no fine for free goods). But if he is of
type α1 then his moral coefficient β, will determine his acceptance/rejection decision. We
examine this issue below:
If β < c
u
, we have p(α1) = 0, because it is optimal to reject. Thus, he gets ’0’ utility.
If β ≥ c
u
, the officer accepts α1, so, p(α1) = 1 and he gets the utility (βu− c).
Again, when α2 is offered as bribe, the officer rejects α2, if his type is α1, and gets ’0’
utility. If his type is α2, he accepts the bribe and gets the utility (βu − c) only if β ≥ cu .
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The officers with β < c
u
reject the bribe of α2. We can express his expected utility as:
EUo =
pip(α1)(βu− c), if pi ≥ 12 ,(1− pi)p(α2)(βu− c), if pi < 12 .
According to the distribution of β, the probability that any non-monetary will be accepted
by an officer is explicitly given by
p(αi) = 1−G(β2), i = 1, 2.
where β2 is the critical value of β such that any officer accepts the non-monetary good αi
with i=1,2 as bribe if his β ≥ β2 and β2 = cu .
The probability of successful bribe for money takes the form of
p(0) = 1−G(β1),
where β1 denotes the critical value of the officer’s β such that any officer with β ≥ β1
accepts money as bribe and it is given by β1 = µFo+cu .
Finally, the dishonest type makes a decision between the options of giving money
or giving one of the free goods. If offering money is not profitable for him, i.e., when
Fc >
b−1
µ
or Fo > u−cµ holds, he offers among the free goods. But, when money as bribe
is profitable both for the dishonest client and for the officer, the option which gives higher
expected payoff will be chosen by the dishonest type. Recall that the dishonest client’s
expected payoff from offering any good is
EUcd =

[1−G(β1)]b− µFc − 1, if he offers money,
pi[1−G(β2)]b− 1, if he offers α1,
(1− pi)[1−G(β2)]b− 1, if he offers α2.
The dishonest client’s behavior on deciding which option to offer as bribe is characterized
by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 :
Suppose that the government bans exchange of money bribes, leaving the two other goods
free. Under the feasible bribe conditions stated above,
when pi ≥ 1
2
, the dishonest client offers α1, if and only if
µFc > b
[
1−G(β1)− pi(1−G(β2))
]
. (2)
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When pi < 1
2
, the dishonest client offers α2, if and only if
µFc > b
[
1−G(β1)− (1− pi)(1−G(β2))
]
. (3)
Note that when the fine is in the interval [0,Fc], it is profitable for client to offer
money. Moreover, there exist a fine F ∗c ∈ [0,Fc] for a given value of pi such that the
dishonest client chooses money as bribe for any Fc ∈ [0,F ∗c ] and he chooses a free good
αi, with i = 1 or 2, for any Fc ∈ (F ∗c , Fc]. When the dishonest client’s free good option is
α1, the expression of this critical fine is F ∗c =
b[1−G(β1)−pi(1−G(β2))]
µ
and it takes the form
of b[1−G(β1)−(1−pi)(1−G(β2))]
µ
when he decides between money and the good α2.
In this formula, F ∗c is the minimum fine above which the client will not offer money
as bribe. This critical F ∗c is a function of pi. When pi = 1, that is to say when the dishonest
client certainly knows that officer is of type α1, we set F ∗c = 0 because the dishonest type
offers α1 for all values of Fc. Similarly, for pi = 0, F ∗c = 0. This time the dishonest client
offers α2 and there exists no region in the interval [0,Fc] such that it is optimal for the
dishonest client to offer money.
Up to now in our analysis, the expected utility of both types of clients from offering
any non-monetary goods is a function of pi, that is of the likelihood that the good they
offer as bribe/gift matches with the officer’s preferences.
3.1.3 Social Welfare
After characterizing the dishonest type’s behavior when the government’s strategy is
to prohibit only one good, we first consider the expected social welfare generated by one
to one matchings of an officer and potential client types. We then form the expected social
welfare according to pi.
If pi ≥ 1
2
;
The honest type chooses α1 among the permitted goods as a gift, which yields the
expected utilities of EUch = piφu − 1 and EUo = piu. So, the total surplus when the
client is honest:
TS = piu(φ+ 1)− 1. (4)
The dishonest type’s decision is to offer α1 when eqn (2) holds. Therefore the expected
utilities of the officer and the dishonest client are respectively, EUcd = pi[1−G(β2)]b− 1
and EUo = pi[1−G(β2)](βu− c), which yield a total surplus of
TS = pi(1−G(β2))(b+ βu− c)− 1.
With probability γ the officer interacts with an honest type, and with probability (1 − γ)
with a dishonest type. So, the expected social welfare when (2) holds is
SW = γ[piu(φ+ 1)− 1] + (1− γ)[pi(1−G(β2))(b+ βu− c− h)− 1]. (5)
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We assume that per a corrupt interaction of a dishonest client and an officer, a constant
social harm ’h’ is produced such that h > (b+βu−c) for β = 1 and all admissible values
of b and c. The harm caused by corruption exceeds the total net benefit that the parties
gain by participating in bribery. So, for any corrupt dealing there exist a constant and a
negative net benefit term, (b+βu−c−h) that decreases the expected social welfare. Note
that as the coefficient of this negative term, i.e., the number of corrupt officers increase,
SW value decreases. This assumption also implies that if γ decreases so the social welfare
does.
Consider now the case where (2) does not hold, that is, the dishonest client offers
money (implying µFc ≤ b[1 − G(c1) − pi(1 − G(β2))]). Then expected payoffs are re-
spectively given as:
EUcd = [1−G(β1)](b− µFc)− 1 and EUo = [1−G(β1)](βu− µFo − c),
so, the total surplus from the match of a dishonest client with the officer when money
is offered is
TS = (1−G(β1))(b+ βu− c)− 1.
In calculating the expected social welfare, we take the government in to account because
it gets the fines Fo and Fc if the bribe is detected. So, fines cancel out and do not appear
in the welfare function. In that case the expected social welfare is (analogue of (5))
SW = γ[piu(φ+ 1)− 1] + (1− γ)[(1−G(β1))(b+ βu− c− h)− 1]. (6)
We continue to determine the expected social welfare functions by considering the
case for pi < 1
2
.
We know that the honest type chooses α2 as a gift, which yields
TS = (1− pi)u(φ+ 1)− 1. (7)
If eqn (3) holds, the dishonest type’s decision is to offer α2 among his two bribery strate-
gies. Then we get the following total surplus from the match of a dishonest client and the
officer:
TS = (1− pi)(1−G(β2))(b+ βu− c)− 1.
With each choice of both client types, the generated expected social welfare will be the
weighted average of these two surpluses:
SW = γ[(1− pi)u(φ+1)− 1] + (1− γ)[(1− pi)(1−G(β2))(b+ βu− c− h)− 1]. (8)
Finally, if eqn (3) does not hold, the dishonest type’s choice is offering money and the
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honest client’s choice however, is still the same. Then equation (8) will take the form of
SW = γ[(1− pi)u(φ+ 1)− 1] + (1− γ)[(1−G(β1))(b+ βu− c− h)− 1]. (9)
We observe that there exist four welfare functions when we distinguish between the two
cases according to pi. In each cases, the honest client’s choice over the goods is fixed
but the dishonest client’s bribery strategy can vary with the fine Fc, and pi values as in-
dicated by Proposition1. The choices of the potential client types and the officer with
the corresponding expected social welfare functions are summarized by the proposition
below.
Proposition 2 :
Suppose that pi ≥ 1
2
,
- The honest type offers α1 and if eqn (2) holds, the dishonest type also offers α1 . So,
these choices produce the SW function given by eqn (5).
- But if eqn (2) does not hold, the dishonest client offers money whereas the honest
client’s choice is the same. Then the SW function is given by eqn (6).
For the case pi < 1
2
,
- The honest type offers α2 and if eqn (3) holds the dishonest type also offers α2. In
this case the generated SW function is given by eqn (8).
- If however, eqn (3) does not hold, only the dishonest client’s choice switches to
money and the SW is given by eqn (9).
3.2 The Government prohibits money plus one good
Besides money, the government this time prohibits α1 or α2. We study both cases and
determine the social welfare in each. In accordance with the government’s objective, the
good which among the two generates a lower social welfare if free, will be prohibited.
First, suppose that the government prohibits α1, so, α2 is the only free good. If the
client is honest, he will have to offer good α2 as a gift, yielding a total surplus in (7). If
the client is dishonest, he chooses his best action which is offering either money or α2. If
(3) holds, he offers α2 and the social welfare of a possible honest/dishonest client-officer
matching is given by (8). Otherwise the dishonest type chooses money, yielding the social
welfare function given by (9).
Now, suppose that the government prohibits α2. The honest type will offer good α1
and the total surplus will be as in (4). On the other hand, the dishonest client offers α1
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only if eqn (2) holds, which yields the social welfare function given by (5). Otherwise, he
chooses money as bribery strategy, and the social welfare is given by (6).
Depending upon the assumption that the dishonest client’s choice is either money
or the free non-monetary good, we have two different SW functions in each case. In
order to characterize the government’s choice as to which good to prohibit besides money,
we compare the generated SW functions according to the dishonest type’s choice. For
example, if the dishonest type chooses α2 when α1 is prohibited and he offers α1 when
α2 is prohibited, we only compare the SW functions given by (5) and (7) to derive the
conditions that produce the higher social welfare. The proposition below summarizes all
the conditions and outcomes that indicate the optimal strategy for the prohibition of the
additional good.
Proposition 3 :
- Suppose (2) holds when α2 is prohibited and (3) holds when α1 is prohibited. So,
we realize the SW functions given by (5) and (8) and observe that
for pi ≥ 1
2
, it is optimal to prohibit α2 and
for pi < 1
2
, it is optimal to prohibit α1 besides money.
- If now (2) holds when α2 is prohibited but (3) does not hold when α1 is prohibited,
we compare (5) and (9) to decide on which good to prohibit additionally and get
these conditions:
for 1
2
≤ pi ≤ p(0)
p(α1)
, prohibiting α2 is optimal.
for p(0)
p(α1)
≤ pi < 1
2
however, prohibiting α1 is the dominant strategy for the govern-
ment.
- Suppose (2) does not hold when α2 is prohibited and (3) holds when α1 is pro-
hibited. By comparison of the SW functions in (6) and (8) we get the following
conditions:
if p(0)
p(α1)
≤ (1− pi) < 1
2
, it is optimal to prohibit α2 and
if 1
2
≤ (1− pi) ≤ p(0)
p(α1)
, it is optimal to prohibit α1 .
- This time if (2) does not hold when α2 is prohibited and (3) also does not satisfy
when α1 is prohibited, the comparison of the SW functions given by (6) and (9)
gives the conditions below such that
if pi ≥ 1
2
, α2 is prohibited and
if pi < 1
2
, α1 is prohibited.
Proposition 3 offers sufficient conditions in each of the four cases above. The neces-
sary conditions are obtained by comparing the welfare functions directly.
Notice that, the optimal policy is to allow the good which is likely to be the officer’s
most preferred good under the conditions given by Proposition 3. The government faces
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a trade off in achieving the higher social welfare: while the dishonest type’s corrupt in-
tention to offer a non-monetary good becomes more possible, so does the honest type’s
benefit from having a larger chance to please the officer.
3.3 The Government prohibits all goods
If all goods are prohibited, the honest client can not offer anything and gets ’0’ utility,
assuming that his income is normalized to 0. An officer who is matched with a honest
client can not get anything either. However, the dishonest client’s dominant strategy is
obviously to offer money, since it will provide the officer certainly with the maximum
utility. Under our assumption that the fine level for all the goods is the same, the dishonest
client does not offer any of the non-monetary goods as bribe, due to the possibility that the
gift may not match with the officer’s preferences. The dishonest client’s expected utility
from offering money and any non-monetary good as bribe is, respectively,
EUcd =
[1−G(β1)]b− µFc − 1, if he offers money,pi[1−G(β1)]b− µFc − 1, if he offers α1.
If he offers α2, the probability pi will be replaced with (1 − pi) in the formula above.
Clearly, offering money gives him higher expected payoff.
Finally, SW only consists of the dishonest client-officer matching that yields a nega-
tive total surplus of
SW = (1− γ)[(1−G(β1))(βu+ b− c− h)− 1)].
3.4 The Government permits all goods, including money
Whenmoney is not fined, the dishonest client will certainly choose money as bribe and
all officers with β ≥ c
u
will accept the bribe. Recall that when money is forbidden, corrupt
officers are those with β ≥ µFo+c
u
. Thus, more officers become corrupt when money is
allowed. The honest client on the other hand, chooses α1 or α2 because he values to
match the officer’s preferences by means of a non-monetary gift instead of directly giving
cash. So, his choice is the same as in the case in which the government prohibits only one
good. He will again make his decision between α1 and α2 according to the distribution of
pi as described previously in deriving the expected payoffs. While determining the social
welfare, the honest client’s choice will be critical.
If pi ≥ 1
2
, the honest type chooses α1 and the social welfare is given by eqn (6).
If pi < 1
2
, the honest type chooses α2 and the social welfare is given by eqn (9).
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3.5 The Government’s optimal policy
We are now in a position to evaluate the optimal choice for the government. Prohibit-
ing all the goods hurts the honest client and produces ’0’ total surplus from the honest
client-officer matching. Given the same level of Fo, the SW function achieved in this case
is less than (6) and (9), the functions obtained when only money is prohibited. So, it is
dominated. In addition, permitting all the goods generates a higher level of corruption
compared to the level achieved under the prohibition of one good because more officers
become corrupt. Further, SW in this case will decrease due to the increased coefficient,
(1 − G( c
u
)), of the negative net benefit term and be less than (6) and (9). So, we can
rule out this option as well. Then the government’s decision will be to prohibit either
one or two goods that is either money or money plus one good. Recall that when one
good is prohibited, it is certainly money and there exist four welfare functions given by
Proposition 2.
Now consider that the government prohibits money plus one good;
In this case, the conditions and outcomes given in Proposition3 follow the social wel-
fare functions given in Proposition2. For example; if 1
2
≤ pi ≤ p(0)
p(α1)
is satisfied, it is
optimal to prohibit α2 so, the honest type’s choice is α1 when two goods are prohibited.
His choice will be again α1 if only money is prohibited. The dishonest type’s choice on
the other hand for both cases is determined by Proposition 1. So, the choices of both
clients are the same under the government’s strategy of prohibiting one or two goods.
After finding out the case(s) in which the maximum SW is achieved, the government
then determines the optimal level of fines Fo and Fc that it imposes as the optimal policy.
Fo determines the number of corrupt officers or equivalently the corruption level and
affects social welfare function negatively. Fc on the other hand, determines the dishonest
client’s bribery choice that is either money or free good. Recall that the choice of the
dishonest client is money among the prohibited goods.
It is useful to consider the special case of Fo = 0 and Fc = 0. Now the government
prohibits one or two goods but impose no fines. The dishonest client certainly chooses
money and the corrupt officers are those with β ≥ c
u
. Considering the probability of
successful bribe for money, where p(0) = (1 − G(µFo+c
u
)) and we observe that when
Fo = 0 the probability that any officer will accept the bribe is higher relative to the case
in which Fo is positive. For this reason social welfare decreases and it cannot attain its
maximum. So, we conclude that the zero fine case is not optimal.
In finding out the optimal fine levels, we first analyze the two regions that is divided
by F ∗c . The dishonest client ’s bribery strategy will be determined by the position of the
given Fc relative to Fc∗ .
First, consider the case when Fc ∈ [0,F ∗c ] for a given pi. The dishonest type’s bribery
offer is money. In order to obtain maximum social welfare, we need to minimize the
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loss, generated by the corrupt interaction, i.e., increase Fo as much as possible such that
corruption level is minimized. The optimal Fo that maximizes the SW function is Fo. So,
the social welfare generated by these conditions is given as:
SW = γ[piu(φ+ 1)− 1] + (1− γ)[(1−G(β1))(b+ βu− c− h)− 1]
such that β1 = µFo+cu . Here, we randomly take pi ≥ 12 to specify both the honest
client’s choice and the SW function.
Now, if the government imposes Fc in the range Fc ∈ (F ∗c , Fc], the dishonest client
will offer the free, non-monetary good. We can instead think of the region Fc ∈ (F ∗c ,∞)
since the dishonest type’s offer will be the same even if Fc > Fc. In this case there is no
need to find the optimal Fo level because there is no fine for the free goods. The fine will
not in fact, be imposed so, SW is independent of Fo and is given as:
SW = γ[piu(φ+ 1)− 1] + (1− γ)[pi(1−G(β2))(b+ βu− c− h)− 1].
such that β2 = cu . We again assume the same condition (pi ≥ 12 ) to make a comparison
of the social welfare functions produced in the two regions, (0, Fc∗] and (Fc∗, ∞). The
proposition below states the conditions that we seek for the government’s optimal policy.
Proposition 4 :
If pi ≥ (1−G(
µFo+c
u
))
(1−G( c
u
))
, the government’s optimal policy is to impose Fc in [0,F ∗c ] and Fo =
Fo. Otherwise, any Fc ∈ (F ∗c , Fc] is the only fine level of the optimal government policy.
Note that if we take pi < 1
2
for the specification the honest client’s choice, we replace
pi with (1− pi) in the proposition above.
4 Optimal policy when the gift can be exchanged for the
most preferred good
In the preceding analysis, we assumed that the officer consumes whatever he gets
as bribe or gift. Depending upon this assumption, the derived expected payoffs of the
potential client types and the officer with the corresponding SW functions specific to all
cases lead us to the main conclusions we obtained on the government’s optimal policy.
Our results also apply if we assume that the officer can sell the good which he does not
like instead of being restricted to consume it. This time, giving him the opportunity that he
can buy his most preferred good buy selling the good that gives him ’0’ utility, will make
difference only in the expected payoffs and SW outcomes in each case. Maximizing SW
as in the previous analysis will be again the key point in determining the government’s
optimal policy. The government will either impose the policy of prohibiting only one
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good or two goods due to the same reasons as explained in the previous section. We
will analyze both cases by characterizing clients’ and officer’s behavior together with the
generated expected payoffs and SW functions.
4.1 The Government prohibits one good
Among the three goods, again money will be the prohibited because the dishonest
client’s benefit from money is maximum. Each client type’s choice on non-monetary
goods is determined by the value of pi. Hence, the SW outcomes are also categorized
according to pi. The analysis starts with the honest client.
4.1.1 The Honest Client
If pi ≥ 1
2
, the honest client chooses α1 as a gift. With probability pi officer gets u utility
and with probability (1−pi) he gets (1−α1)u utility by selling the gift and buying (1-α1)
unit of α2, his most preferred good. As for the case of pi < 12 the honest client gives α2
and the officer this time analogously, gets u utility with probability (1 − pi). Otherwise
he gets (1− α2)u utility with probability pi. So, the expected utility of the officer and the
altruistic honest client is given respectively as:
EUo =
piu+ (1− pi)u(1− α1), if pi ≥ 12 ,(1− pi)u+ piu(1− α2), if pi < 12 . (10)
EUch =
piφu+ (1− pi)φu(1− α1)− 1, if pi ≥ 12 ,(1− pi)φu+ piφu(1− α2)− 1, if pi < 12 . (11)
4.1.2 The Dishonest Client
The dishonest client on the other hand, considers either offering money or one of
the free goods. His expected payoff from offering money and the related feasible bribe
conditions are the same as in the previous analysis so, we will be interested in the client’s
free good choice. Considering the possibility of offering a non-monetary free gift, the
officer will accept the bribe if
EUo = βUs(αi, 1)− c ≥ 0
where i = 1, 2. The dishonest client offers α1 for pi ≥ 12 . If the officer is of type α1, he
accepts the bribe whenever βu − c ≥ 0. Any officer of type α1 will accept the bribe if
his moral coefficient β ≥ c
u
otherwise, the ones with β < c
u
will reject it although the gift
matches with their preferences. So, the probability of successful bribe with any officer of
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type α1 when the gift of α1 is offered to him is denoted as:
pα1(α1) = (1−G(
c
u
))
where the first subscript denotes the officer’s type and the second one denotes the offered
gift’s characteristic.
But if the officer is of type α2, he sells the gift of characteristic α1 and buys (1- α1)
unit from his favorite good α2. He accepts the bribe if βu(1−α1)− c ≥ 0 holds and gets
βu(1 − α1) − c utility in this situation. So, probability that any officer of type α2 will
accept the gift α1 is
pα2(α1) = (1−G(
c
(1− α1)u)).
Note that as the gift offered has higher liquidity, i.e., low αi value, the probability of
successful bribe is also higher because even if the gift does not match with the officer’s
preferences, he can exchange it for his favorite good by deriving a utility close to the
maximum value, u. If the gift matches with the officer’s preferences, the dishonest type
has the highest chance for successful bribe.
Now, the dishonest client’s expected payoff from offering α1 is
EUcd = pipα1(α1)b+ (1− pi)pα2(α1)b− 1. (12)
Then, the expected utility of the officer is
EUo = pipα1(α1)(βu− c) + (1− pi)pα2(α1)(βu(1− α1)− c). (13)
As for the case of pi < 1
2
, the dishonest type offers α2. If the officer is of type α2, he
will accept it whenever βu − c ≥ 0. The probability of successful bribe in this case is
given as:
pα2(α2) = (1−G(
c
u
)).
If the officer is of type α1, he will accept the bribe when βu(1 − α2) − c ≥ 0 holds so,
the probability that bribe is successful when the gift of characteristic α2 is offered is
pα1(α2) = (1−G(
c
(1− α2)u)).
The expected utility of the dishonest client from offering the gift of α2 is
EUcd = (1− pi)pα2(α2)b+ pipα1(α2)b− 1. (14)
Considering the expected utility that the officer gets, it is given as:
EUo = (1− pi)pα2(α2)(βu− c) + pipα1(α2)(βu(1− α2)− c). (15)
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Recall that the dishonest client’s expected payoff from offering money is given as:
EUcd = p(0)b− µFc − 1
where p(0) = (1−G(µFo+c
u
)).
Considering the expected payoffs of the dishonest client from offering the non-monetary
goods α1 and α2 (12 and 14) with the payoff he derives from offering money, we can
characterize the dishonest type’s bribery choice when government prohibits only money
as follows:
Proposition 5 :
Suppose that the government prohibits money bribes, leaving the other two goods free.
Under the feasible bribe conditions stated previously,
when pi ≥ 1
2
, dishonest type offers α1 if and only if,
µFc > b
[(
1−G(µFo + c
u
)
)
− pi
(
1−G( c
u
)
)
− (1− pi)
(
1−G( c
(1− α1)u)
)]
. (16)
When pi < 1
2
, the dishonest type offers α2 if and only if,
µFc > b
[(
1−G(µFo + c
u
)
)
− (1− pi)
(
1−G( c
u
)
)
− pi
(
1−G( c
(1− α2)u)
)]
. (17)
According to the inequalities given by the proposition, it can be inferred that as the
liquidity of any non-monetary good αi is higher, then F ∗c is smaller such that for a large
portion of Fc in the interval [0,Fc] the dishonest type prefers αi to money. He offers
money only for sufficiently low values of Fc or pi/(1 − pi). In addition to high liquidity,
if this non-monetary good is also more likely to be the officer’s most preferred good, then
F ∗c further gets smaller.
Notice that, up to now in the analysis of the behaviors of the clients and the officer,
liquidity value has an important role in the expected payoffs. Considering all agents’
expected payoff from offering and receiving any non - monetary gift, they benefit more
as the gift has higher liquidity. Further, the dishonest client has a higher chance for a
successful bribe because the number of officers accepting the bribe increases as the good
offered is more liquid. The corrupt officers who accept the free good are those with
β ≥ c
(1−αi)u , i = 1, 2. So, as αi is closer to ’0’, the probability that any officer will accept
the bribe increases.
After characterizing the dishonest type’s behavior, now we will determine the social
welfare produced from a one-to-one matching of an officer and any type of client.
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4.1.3 Social Welfare
When the honest client offers α1, the total surplus arising from a honest client-officer
matching is the sum of (10) and (11).
TS = u(φ+ 1)(pi + (1− pi)(1− α1))− 1.
The dishonest client’s choice is to offer α1 when eqn (16) holds. So, the total surplus
of the dishonest client-officer matching is produced by eqns (12) and (13).
TS = pipα1(α1)(βu+ b− c) + (1− pi)pα2(α1)(βu(1− α1) + b− c)− 1.
It is worth to note that the total surplus of the dishonest client-officer matching is again
negative because if h > (βu + b − c) then h > (βu(1 − α1) + b − c) also satisfies. The
expected social welfare with the indicated choices of both clients is then:
SW = γ
[
u(φ+ 1)(pi + (1− pi)(1− α1))− 1
]
+
(1−γ)
[
pipα1(α1)(βu+ b− c−h)+ (1−pi)pα2(α1)(βu(1−α1)+ b− c−h)− 1
]
. (18)
The dishonest type’s choice is money if eqn (16) does not hold and the honest client’s
choice of gift is the same. So, the expected social welfare takes the form of
SW = γ
[
u(φ+1)(pi+(1−pi)(1−α1))−1
]
+(1−γ)
[
p(0)(βu+ b− c−h)−1
]
. (19)
When the honest type offers α2, the total surplus of this matching is generated by (10)
and (11) and is given as:
TS = u(φ+ 1)((1− pi) + pi(1− α2))− 1.
This time the dishonest type offers α2 if eqn (17) holds. After determining the total surplus
of the dishonest client - officer matching, the expected social welfare follows as:
TS = (1− pi)pα2(α2)(βu+ b− c) + pipα1(α2)(βu(1− α2) + b− c)− 1.
SW = γ
[
u(φ+ 1)((1− pi) + pi(1− α2))− 1
]
+
(1−γ)
[
(1−pi)pα2(α2)(βu+ b− c−h)+pipα1(α2)(βu(1−α2)+ b− c−h)− 1
]
. (20)
The dishonest type offers money if (17) does not hold. Finally, social welfare is de-
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rived as:
SW = γ
[
u(φ+1)((1−pi)+pi(1−α2))−1
]
+(1−γ)
[
p(0)(βu+ b− c−h)−1
]
. (21)
4.2 The Government prohibits money plus one good
Now, the government’s task is to decide on the additional good in order which to
prohibit besides money. It has two options as before: either prohibiting α1 or α2.
First, suppose that government prohibits α1:
The honest client chooses α2 as usual and the dishonest client offers α2 when (17)
holds so, SW is given by (20), otherwise dishonest type offers money and SW is (21).
This time consider that α2 is prohibited:
The honest client gives α1 and the dishonest client also offers α1 if (16) holds so, SW
is given by (18) otherwise, the dishonest client’s choice is money and SW is (19).
The comparison of the SW functions derived in each case will give the outcome. We
again make case by case analysis due to the two bribery options of the dishonest client.
The analysis of the conditions is as follows:
Proposition 6 :
- Suppose that (16) holds when the government prohibits α2 and (17) holds when
it prohibits α1. We realize the welfare functions given by (18) and (20). So, the
conditions that reveal the higher welfare are given as:
for pi
1−pi ≥ α1α2 and
pα1 (α2)
pα2 (α1)
≤ ∆u1
∆u2
, it is optimal to prohibit α2 otherwise,
for pi
1−pi <
α1
α2
and pα1 (α2)
pα2 (α1)
> ∆u1
∆u2
, it is optimal to prohibit α1.
- If now (16) holds when α2 is prohibited but (17) does not hold when α1 is prohibited,
we compare the functions in (18) and (21) and get the following:
for pi
1−pi ≤ α1α2 and
p(0)
p(α1)
≤ pi, it is optimal to prohibit α1.
- Suppose (16) does not hold when α2 is prohibited and (17) holds when α1 is pro-
hibited. By comparison of the SW functions in (19) and (20) we get the conditions
below:
for pi
1−pi ≥ α1α2 and
p(0)
p(α1)
≤ (1− pi), it is optimal to prohibit α1.
- Finally, if (16) does not hold when α2 is prohibited and (17) does not hold when α1
is prohibited, comparison of (19) and (21) gives us these conditions such that
for pi
1−pi ≥ α1α2 , it is optimal to prohibit α2.
for pi
1−pi ≤ α1α2 , it is optimal to prohibit α1.
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We denote
∆u1 = (βu(1− α1) + b− c− h) and
∆u2 = (βu(1− α2) + b− c− h).
The comparison of SW functions provide us with two sufficient conditions. If these
two conditions hold, the government prohibits one of αi with i=1,2 besides money. For
the first case for example, the expression pi
1−pi ≥ α1α2 implies that pi > 12 can satisfy this
inequality. The good α1, with higher probability and liquidity is free. Note that the
total surplus of the honest type-officer matching increases as the good offered has such
properties. (αi → 0, pi/1 − pi → 1). So, the honest client and the officer benefits more
when the first condition satisfies. The second condition pα1 (α2)
pα2 (α1)
≤ ∆u1
∆u2
implies that the loss
in the surplus of the dishonest client-officer due to the corrupt interaction is less when α1
is free so, a higher social welfare is achieved.
In the following cases, the same argument applies. The first inequalities indicate that
the honest type-officer surplus is higher by the suggested policy and the second condition
is sufficient to generate less loss in the surplus of the dishonest client-officer. For the
second and third cases only one sufficient condition for the optimal strategy is derived.
4.3 The Government’s optimal policy
In this section we again find out that the social welfare functions are the same when
one or two of the goods are prohibited. Considering the case in which all goods are pro-
hibited, we observe that the social welfare produced consists of the negative total surplus
of the dishonest client-officer matching because the honest type can not offer any gift. So,
this case is the one in which the least welfare is achieved. Permitting all the goods how-
ever, increases the possibility of successful bribe because when there is no fine on money,
more officers will tend to accept the bribe. So, this case increases the loss due to the
corrupt interaction and decreases the social welfare when compared to the case in which
money is fined. The remaining two cases; prohibiting only money and money plus one
good again produces the same social welfare values assuming everything else staying at
the same level. If the conditions for the prohibition of the second good hold, both clients’
choice is equivalent under the same conditions.
In finding out the government’s strategy for the optimal fine levels, we first determine
the dishonest client’s choice among the money and the non-monetary, free good. As
before for a given pi and the liquidity of the good offered, F ∗c is found. The position of
given Fc relative to F ∗c will determine the dishonest client’s bribery strategy.
If the government imposes Fc in [0, F ∗c ];
The dishonest type offers money. Here, we again randomly take pi ≥ 1
2
to specify the
honest client’s offer so, the social welfare. The dishonest client prefers money to α1 in
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this case the honest client, however, offers α1 such that the SW outcome is
SW = γ
[
u(φ+1)(pi+(1−pi)(1−α1))−1
]
+(1−γ)
[
(1−G(µFo + c
u
))(βu+b−c−h)−1
]
.
As in the previous analysis in order to maximize the SW, the government sets Fo to
its highest value when the bribery strategy of the dishonest client is money. So, the loss
(βu+ b− c− h) will be minimized if Fo = Fo.
With the fine levels Fc ∈[0, Fc] and Fo = Fo, we get
SW = γ
[
u(φ+1)(pi+(1−pi)(1−α1))−1
]
+(1−γ)
[
(1−G(µFo + c
u
))(βu+b−c−h)−1
]
.
Consider now if the government imposes Fc such that Fc ∈ (F ∗c , Fc].
The dishonest type offers a free, non-monetary good. Again assuming that pi ≥ 1
2
, the
dishonest type offers α1 as the honest type does. So, we get
SW = γ
[
u(φ+ 1)(pi + (1− pi)(1− α1))− 1
]
+
(1− γ)
[
pipα1(α1)(βu+ b− c− h) + (1− pi)pα2(α1)(βu(1− α1) + b− c− h)− 1
]
.
Now, the optimal policy of the government follows with the similar conditions which
were previously found.
Proposition 7 :
If pi ≥ (1−G(
µFo+c
u
))
(1−G( c
u
))
holds, the social welfare is higher. Hence, the optimal government
policy is to impose Fc ∈ [0, F ∗c ], Fo = Fo and prohibit either only money or money plus
one good.
Since we assumed pi ≥ 1
2
in order to determine the welfare functions, the condition is
related with pi. If we take pi < 1
2
, then our condition in the proposition takes the form of
(1− pi) ≥ (1−G(
µFo+c
u
))
(1−G( c
u
))
. Note that this is a sufficient condition.
This time full characterization of conditions for the optimal policy as in the previous
section is not possible. We can only derive the sufficient condition.
5 The Analysis for N goods
5.1 The gift can only be consumed
In this section we aim to apply the same scenario for N goods and see how the same
properties (liquidity and incomplete information about the officer’s preferences) of the
goods interact to shape the government’s decision about which goods to consider as bribe
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if offered to an officer. At the first stage, we maintain the assumption that the officer can
consume whatever he gets as bribe/gift. We think of N goods each with a specific pii value.
We then generate a vector of the N goods for both client types ranking them in an order
starting from the one which is most likely to be the most preferred, to the one that is least
likely. That is good 1 is the good with the highest pi, denoted pi1, and so on.
P =

pi1
pi2
...
piN

So, there exist a relation between the probabilities of N goods such that
pi1 > pi2 > · · · > piN .
We denote the liquidity of the good i by αi. So, any good with pii has liquidity αi,
where i = 1, 2, · · · , N. Note that there is no order in the liquidity values of the goods;
these are labeled and ranked according to pi values. We assume that pi′is and α
′
is are
common knowledge. The officer’s most preferred good provides him with the maximum
utility u and he derives Us(αi, 1) utility that vary between [0,u) from the remaining goods.
5.1.1 The Government prohibits one good
To start with the first general case, when only money is prohibited, both client types
offer the good α1. If α1 is prohibited besides money, then the good with probability pi2 is
offered. The profile we generate also indicates both clients’ non-monetary good offering
order when the goods with higher liquidity are prohibited. The honest client in this case
offers α1. The dishonest client on the other hand, offers either α1 or money. In either case,
with probability pi1 the honest client gets φu utility and with probability (1− pi1) he gets
φUs(α1, 1). So, the expression of the total surplus of the honest client-officer matching is
TS = pi1u(φ+ 1) + (1− pi1)Us(α1, 1)(φ+ 1).
The dishonest type will get benefit b if the officer is of type α1 and has β ≥ cu . But if the
officer is of any type other than α1, he accepts the bribe whenever βUs(α1, 1) − c ≥ 0.
So, the expected payoffs of the dishonest client and of the officer are
EUcd = b
[
pi1pα1(α1) + (1− pi1)pαj(α1)
]
− 1,
EUo = pi1pα1(α1)(βu− c) + (1− pi1)pαj(α1)(βUs(α1, 1)− c)
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where j 6= 1. This time, the probability that any officer will accept the bribe, pαj(αi), is
written as:
pαj(αi) =
1−G( cu), if i = j = 1, 2, . . . , N,1−G( c
Us(αi,1)
), if i 6= j.
where the subscript αj denotes the officer’s type and αi denotes the gift offered. The total
surplus from the dishonest client-officer pair and the SW function when the dishonest
type offers α1 can be obtained as follows:
TS = pi1pα1(α1)(βu+ b− c− h) + (1− pi1)pαj(α1)(βUs(α1, 1) + b− c− h)− 1.
SW = γ
[
pi1u(φ+ 1) + (1− pi1)Us(α1, 1)(φ+ 1)
]
+
(1−γ)
[
pi1pα1(α1)(βu+b−c−h)+(1−pi1)pαj(α1)(βUs(α1, 1)+b−c−h)−1
]
. (22)
Now, consider the dishonest client’s other alternative of offering money. He offers money
if (1) is non-negative. Further, he still chooses money rather than good αi if the condition
below holds:
µFc ≤ b
[
p(0)− pii(1−G( c
u
))− (1− pii)(1−G( c
Us(αi, 1)
))
]
. (23)
In this case, i = 1. This equation characterizes the dishonest client’s behavior. Hence, the
SW achieved when (23) holds for i=1 takes the form of
SW = γ
[
pi1u(φ+1)+(1−pi1)Us(α1, 1)(φ+1)
]
+(1−γ)
[
(p(0)(βu+b−c−h)−1)
]
. (24)
These are the two relevant SW functions when the government prohibits only money.
5.1.2 The Government prohibits money plus one good
We deepen the analysis by considering the prohibition of the additional good. If the
government prohibits any good other than α1 besides money, both clients will offer α1
as a non-monetary good because it is more likely to match with the officer’s preferences
than any other good αi. The social welfare outcomes in this case were found earlier as
(22) and (24). First, note that the government will prohibit α1, the good with the highest
probability of being the most preferred good. Now, the best offer that escapes the sanction
is α2, for both types of client. There exist two possible SW functions that will be shaped
by the dishonest client’s choice of money and α2. The SW function that will be derived
when both clients offer α2 is
SW = γ
[
pi2u(φ+ 1) + (1− pi2)Us(α2, 1)(φ+ 1)
]
+
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(1− γ)
[
pi2pα2(α2)(βu+ b− c−h)+ (1−pi2)pαj(α2)(βUs(α2, 1)+ b− c−h)− 1
]
(25)
where j 6= 2. If (23) holds for i = 2, the dishonest client offers money and the SW is
SW = γ
[
pi2u(φ+1)+(1−pi2)Us(α2, 1)(φ+1)
]
+(1−γ)
[
(p(0)(βu+b−c−h)−1)
]
. (26)
In finding out which good to prohibit as the second, we assume the following important
condition that enable us to reach a conclusion about the government’s strategy.
If the condition
Us(αi+1, 1)
Us(αi, 1)
≤ 1− pii
1− pii+1 ≤
pαj(αi+1)
pαj(αi)
(27)
satisfies, where i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, we get a relationship between the social welfare of
the client types when their choice are the same non-monetary good. According to this
generalized condition, for i= 1 we observe that the SW achieved when both clients choose
α1 is greater than that of both choosing α2 by comparing (22) and (25). If we compare
the SW functions for all i, we derive
SWα1 > SWα2 > . . . > SWαN
where the subscript αi denotes the social welfare produced when both clients offer the
same non-monetary good αi. This condition guarantees that as the clients are restricted
to choose the goods with lower pii ’s, the social welfare tends to decrease.
Now consider that the dishonest client offers money while the honest client offers any
pii (This implies that (23) holds). The SW function produced turns out to take the form of
SW = γ
[
piiu(φ+1)+(1−pii)Us(αi, 1)(φ+1)
]
+(1−γ)
[
(p(0)(βu+b−c−h)−1)
]
. (28)
If only money is prohibited, i = 1 in the above formula. We encounter an interesting
case such that if the dishonest client prefers to offer money instead of α1, he continues
to offer money even if any other of the good(s) is prohibited besides money. Since the
expected payoff he takes from offering money is higher than that of offering α1, his payoff
frommoney will still be higher than that from offering α2 or any of αi. So, if the condition
above (equation (27)) prevails, the social welfare produced by the dishonest client’s choice
of money and the honest client’s choice of αi is the highest for i = 1 and it decreases as
pii decreases (see eqn (28)).
Another point which is worth to note is that if the dishonest type offers α1 ((23)
does not hold for i=1) when only money is prohibited, his offer of α1 can switch to
money or another non-monetary good that can be either α2 or itself when money plus one
good is prohibited. So, we need an additional condition that gives the higher SW from
the comparison of these welfare functions that vary according to the dishonest client’s
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different choices. We derive that if the condition below holds besides (27) the SW attains
its highest value.
piipαj(αi)
p(0)
≥ ∆u0
∆ui
.
Here,∆u0 = (βu+b−c−h) and∆ui = (βUs(αi, 1)+b−c−h) denote the net benefits.
These conditions are also sufficient to find out the optimal strategy. It turns out that the
government does not prohibit pi1 because when it is free under these two conditions stated
above, maximum welfare is achieved. Hence, the government prohibits only money or
money plus any good(s) except α1.
The following proposition summarizes the sufficient conditions for the government’s
strategy on which good to prohibit.
Proposition 8 :
If Us(αi+1,1)
Us(αi,1)
≤ 1−pii
1−pii+1 ≤
pαj (αi+1)
pαj (αi)
and
piipαj (αi)
p(0)
≥ ∆u0
∆u1
hold, the government prohibits
only money or any other good(s) than α1 besides money.
The first part, Us(αi+1,1)
Us(αi,1)
≤ 1−pii
1−pii+1 , of the first inequality implies that if any good αi,
with a higher probability gives the officer also more utility than a good αi+1, a higher
surplus from the honest client-officer interaction is produced. The second part, 1−pii
1−pii+1 ≤
pαj (αi+1)
pαj (αi)
, provides less negative surplus for αi from the dishonest client-officer interaction
when compared to αi+1. The second condition guarantees that the two welfare functions
obtained when α1 is free are higher than the other functions obtained in any case.
The similarities of the analysis for N goods and only for three goods lie in the fact that
since the gift is just consumed, its liquidity has no effect in the expected payoffs, SW
functions and even in the conditions we derived for determining the government’s policy.
It is the probability of preference that plays the most important role.
5.2 The gift offered can be sold
The final step in the analysis of N goods is to allow the officer to sell the gift. The same
setting continues to apply. This time we will observe the effect of the liquidity together
with the probability of preference.
5.2.1 The Government prohibits one good
There is no change in the criteria of the two clients’ choices. Both types offer the
gift/bribe according to the order in the goods profile. The officer however, can sell the
good if u(1 − αi) > Us(αi, 1) is satisfied otherwise, he consumes it. So, we formulate
the officer’s utility as the maximum of these two utility values. The honest client offers
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α1 and the expected payoff and the total surplus of this matching is
EUch = pi1φu+ (1− pi1)φmax{Us(α1, 1), u(1− α1)},
TS = pi1(φ+ 1)u+ (1− pi1)(φ+ 1)max{Us(α1, 1), u(1− α1)}.
The dishonest client’s expected payoff from offering α1 is
EUcd = b
[
pi1(1−G( c
u
)) + (1− pi1)(1−G( c
max{Us(α1, 1), u(1− α1)}))
]
− 1.
This time we use the notation of pαj(αi) which is a little different than before, such that
pαj(αi) =
1−G( cu), if i = j = 1, 2, . . . , N,1−G( c
max{Us(αi,1),u(1−αi))}), if i 6= j.
Taking the dishonest client’s choice of money in to account, his behavior about his two
bribery strategies is characterized by the equation below:
µFc ≤ b
[
p(0)− piipαi(αi)− (1− pii)pαj(αi)
]
. (29)
In this equation, i 6= j. If it holds for i = 1, the dishonest client prefers money to α1 and
so on for any i.
The officer on the other hand, gets (βu − c) utility if he is of type α1 and has β ≥
c
u
. Otherwise he gets (βmax{Us(α1, 1), u(1 − α1)} − c) utility with (1 − pi1)pαj(α1)
probability. So, his expected payoff is
EUo = pi1pα1(α1)(βu− c) + (1− pi1)pαj(α1)(βmax{Us(α1, 1), u(1− α1)} − c).
After determining the expected payoffs, the total surplus of the dishonest client-officer
interaction is
TS = pi1pα1(α1)(βu+ b− c− h)+
(1− pi1)pαj(α1)(βmax{Us(α1, 1), u(1− α1)}+ b− c− h)− 1.
The social welfare produced by the dishonest type’s choice of α1 (if so, then (29) does
not hold for i = 1) and the honest type’s offer of α1 produces the SW function which is
in the form of
SW = γ
[
pi1(φ+ 1)u+ (1− pi1)(φ+ 1)max{Us(α1, 1), u(1− α1)}
]
+
(1− γ)
[
pi1pα1(α1)(βu+ b− c− h)+
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(1− pi1)pαj(α1)(βmax{Us(α1, 1), u(1− α1)}+ b− c− h)− 1
]
. (30)
where j 6= 1. Consider now if the dishonest client offers money ((29) does holds for
i = 1). The SW function is given as:
SW = γ
[
pi1(φ+ 1)u+ (1− pi1)(φ+ 1)max{Us(α1, 1), u(1− α1)}
]
+
(1− γ)
[
p(0)(βu+ b− c− h)− 1
]
. (31)
5.2.2 The Government prohibits money plus one good
First, we handle the case of prohibiting α1, then α2 and so on in order to observe the
change in the SW functions and to decide on which good to prohibit. If α1 is prohibited,
then the honest type certainly offers α2 and the dishonest type also offers α2 if (29) does
not hold for i = 2. In this case
SW = γ
[
pi2(φ+ 1)u+ (1− pi2)(φ+ 1)max{Us(α2, 1), u(1− α2)}
]
+
(1− γ)
[
pi2pα2(α2)(βu+ b− c− h)+
(1− pi2)pαj(α2)(βmax{Us(α2, 1), u(1− α2)}+ b− c− h)− 1
]
. (32)
where j 6= 2. The other SW function produced by the dishonest client’s choice of money
(29 holds for i=2) is given by
SW = γ
[
pi2(φ+ 1)u+ (1− pi2)(φ+ 1)max{Us(α2, 1), u(1− α2)}
]
+
(1− γ)
[
p(0)(βu+ b− c− h)− 1
]
. (33)
Now, consider the prohibition of the good α2. The honest type chooses α1 and the SW
outcome if the dishonest type also chooses α1 is given by (30). When the dishonest client
offers money, the SW will take the form of (31). If the expected utility he receives from
offering money is greater than from offering α1, he always offers money even if any
good(s) is prohibited. We will have the same SW outcomes even if any good(s) other than
α1 is prohibited besides money. Hence, we first compare the equations (30) and (31) with
(32) and (33).
Under the condition
pαj (α2)
pαj (α1)
≥ 1−pi1
1−pi2 ≥
max{Us(α2,1),u(1−α2)}
max{Us(α1,1),u(1−α1)} , the SW achieved when
both clients offer α1 is greater than when they both offer α2. Moreover, if we impose
the condition
pi1pαj (α1)
p(0)
≥ ∆uo
∆u1
, the SW produced by both client’s choice of α1 is greater
than the SW produced by the dishonest client’s choice of money when α1 is prohibited.
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Explicitly, ∆uo is the same as before but this time
∆u1 = (βmax{Us(α1, 1), u(1− α1)}+ b− c− h).
We can generalize these two conditions for N goods by the following proposition and
have the same outcome for the government’s strategy.
Proposition 9 :
If the two conditions below hold, the highest social welfare is achieved when only money
or money plus any good except α1 is prohibited .
pαj(αi+1)
pαj(αi)
≥ 1− pii
1− pii+1 ≥
max{Us(αi+1, 1), u(1− αi+1)}
max{Us(αi, 1), u(1− αi)}
piipαj(αi)
p(0)
≥ ∆uo
∆ui
Again, Proposition 9 offers a sufficient condition. The exact condition is given by the
comparison of the corresponding welfare functions, which, unfortunately cannot be re-
duced to simple formulas.
6 Concluding Remarks
This thesis incorporates the possibility of gift giving as a form of bribery and ana-
lyzes the gift’s properties in causing corrupt interactions. The properties of the gifts we
discuss in our model are the liquidity and the possibility of matching with the officer’s
preferences. At the first stage of our analysis in which we consider only three goods, we
find out that the officer’s preferences play the key role in determining the bribery con-
ditions whereas liquidity has no effect. As the probability (pi) that a gift is the officer’s
most preferred choice increases, it is more likely that the dishonest client offers that gift
as bribe and achieves his bribery goal because the probability of successful bribe when a
free good is offered is higher than that when the prohibited good is offered. The impact of
preferences on the social welfare however, is not obvious. While the total surplus of the
honest client-officer pair increases due to an increase in pi or (1−pi), the total surplus from
the corrupt dealing of a dishonest client-officer pair decreases. In determining the optimal
government policy, we seek the conditions that maximize the surplus of the honest client-
officer matching and that at the same time minimize the loss from the corrupt interaction
of the dishonest client and the officer. Another effect of pi also appears in government’s
decision on which good to prohibit besides money. We observe in Section 3.2 that while
the good with the lower pi value is prohibited, in some cases an additional condition in
order to guarantee less loss form the corrupt dealings is necessary. These results suggest
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that it is optimal to allow the good which is believed to be more appropriate for gift-giving
in society as long as the conditions stated by Proposition 3 are satisfied.
Secondly, we allow the officer to exchange the gift for his most preferred good in order
to highlight the impact of the liquidity on corrupt incentives. This time, liquidity besides
preferences plays role in bribe-aimed interactions. As the non-monetary gift offered has
higher liquidity, the dishonest client has higher chance for successful bribe because even
if the officer’s preferences do not match with the gift offered as bribe, he can exchange it
for his favorite good that will provide him nearly with the maximum utility. For higher
liquidity values, the number of officers that accept the bribe increases. Analogously as
in the previous stage, while higher liquidity results in higher total surplus of the honest
client-officer matching, it produces more loss in the social welfare due to the dishonest
client-officer interaction. Related to the impact on the social welfare, liquidity besides the
value of pi will determine the government’s decision on which good to prohibit besides
money. If the gift which has higher pi is also more liquid, the government can allow it
only if its potential social harm that stems from its susceptibility to bribery is minimized
by an additional condition ( see section 4.2 ). The assumption that the officer can sell the
gift is more realistic. The reason we handle the analysis at two stages is that we aim to
highlight the impacts of the preferences and the liquidity on corrupt dealings separately.
The extension to the case of N goods is more restrictive because we impose a few
more conditions to reach a conclusion on the government’s optimal policy. We again find
out that for the case in which the gift can only be consumed, only preferences will be ef-
fective in bribery decisions. As long as the conditions derived by Proposition 8 hold, the
government allows the good with the highest probability. An important point concerning
this outcome is that the good with the higher probability is assumed to give the officer
higher utility. Due to this assumption when α1 (the good with the highest probability)
is allowed, the social welfare attains its maximum. It is similar to the conclusion of the
previous stage in which we assumed only three goods in that the government allows the
good with the higher probability under some conditions. The government’s optimal pol-
icy is the same for the case in which the gift can be sold. This time the conditions that
render the conclusion are a bit different. Proposition 9 implies that the government al-
lows α1 to achieve the maximum welfare only if we maintain the condition that the good
with the higher probability provides the officer with the higher utility. We observe that
the conditions given by Proposition 8 is a special case of the ones given in Proposition
9 because the officer chooses between the options of either consuming it or selling de-
pending upon the utility he derives from each. The liquidity value in this case will play
the role if the officer exchanges the gift for his favorite choice. We can also have such an
extreme situation that the officer prefers to sell the gift for all possible offer of goods. So,
the conclusion about the optimal policy turns out to sound as if the good with the higher
probability is also more liquid, the government’s strategy will be to prohibit any good
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other than α1. This case’s similarity to the previous stage is that the government allows
the good with the higher probability and liquidity only if the stated conditions given by
the relevant propositions are satisfied.
Another extension which is not plausible to deal with is to consider a continuum of
goods. The difficulty of this case is to define the officer’s preferences over the infinite
number of goods. So, any assumption on officer’s preferences will leave us with a very
restrictive framework that is not worthwhile.
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